Double Triple Chance Taktik

Double Triple Chance Taktik Drehe am Glücksrad!

Die perfekt Double Triple Chance Taktik wird Ihnen in unserem Automaten Trickbuch sehr genau erläutert. Unsere Triple Chance Tricks lassen. Merkur hat mit Triple Chance, Double Triple Chance und Triple Triple Chance eine Slot-Familie geschaffen, die genau diesen Typus Spieler anspricht. Alle drei​. Double triple chance taktik spiele umsonst die besten free to play games zusammen mit freunden oder schule deine fähigkeiten im kampf gegen das spiel selbst. Das Slotspiel Double Triple Chance wird überall angeboten wo es Merkur Allerdings gibt es Taktiken, die der Spieler einhalten sollte. Der einzige Unterschied: Bei Double Triple Chance besteht das Glücksrad im Denn früher oder später wird meist jede Taktik wiederlegt.

Double Triple Chance Taktik

Ich habe für dich die besten Triple Chance Tricks zusammengestellt. Im Sunmaker Casino kannst du kostenlos und ohne Anmeldung spielen! 18+, AGB gelten. Double triple chance taktik spiele umsonst die besten free to play games zusammen mit freunden oder schule deine fähigkeiten im kampf gegen das spiel selbst. Double Triple Chance mit Echtgeld spielen ▷ Der Merkur-Klassiker kann nicht Um eine möglichst rentable Taktik aufzustellen, solltet ihr folgende Tipps und.

Sayang gk bs kasih screen shot Ahh cara penggunaan yg menarik yang perlu diperhatikan para battler terlepas dari GOkong , CHarles , yang mahal2 deh : 1.

Detector Brown sebagai shield Detector Brown menarik untuk dihunt Selamat berjuang Saya suka kata2 bang Fahmi Sulit dinilai oleh orang lain" Saya banget Saya berhasil puasa gacha event trakhir minggu lalu smpai skrg Ikutin jejak senpai Fahmi Kayaknya gw ga cocok banget untuk kocok gacha deh Max gacha bintang 6 doank yg kudapetin , tidak sekalipun kudapetin ranger bintang 7 apalagi 8 hiks menyedihkan Oh iya jgn lupa add id gw ya kikiwm.

PATIENCE IS KEY intinya ENJOY SAJA, awalnya saya adalah tergolong orang yang selalu menyiapkan anggaran tiap bulannya untuk game ini, tidak dipungkiri saya sudah menghabiskan jt sejak event carol hingga pada akhirnya pocer tidak ada lagi untungnya Bagi saya gacha zonk adalah pembelajaran, ubi saya habiskan dalam sekejap demi mendapatkan gokong dan charles tapi hasilnya tidak sesuai harapan.

Bagaimana tidak? Bagi saya itu udah cukup. Disini awal kiprah saya menjadi seorang FREE Player, Bermodalkan ubi hasil naik level dan masterin ranger saya bisa gajian ubi.

Dan itu saya jadikan modal buat minggu depannya untuk masuk ke zona ubi, sebab zona ubi cukup profit dari zona lainnya.

Buang jauh2 persepsi atau opini bahwa DEV. Toh kamu juga masih bisa eksis di game ini, perkara ranger bagus itu hanya masalah waktu, tetap ada jalan bagi seorang FREE Player.

Alon Alon Asal Kelakon.. Saya hanya mengandalkan itu saja, main rutin setiap hari.. Mungkin saya lebih beruntung di Spin daripada Gatcha..

Untuk pertama kalinye ane komen di blog ini dan komen ane ini tentang unek-unek gacha sialan ini. Soal double zonk, ente salah gan.

Masa ane bela-belain gacha 30 ubi 4 kali dapetnye sampah semua. Jangankan ranger baru, bintang 6 aje kagak dapet. Ane dapetnye cuma explorer sindy, lia, charismatic jessica, n yello doang.

Seketika ane kesel setengah mati apalagi ditambah LR juga pelit banget di spin rewards special stage dimane ane kagak pernah dapet 1 ranger atau 1 super leonard pun selama 1 minggu ini.

Bener-bener deh, kalo LR udeh terlalu pelit gini ane sih niatnye mo pensi. Ane paling kagak suka game pelit kayak LR Add my id: franzfranzfranz89 gak perlu beli ubi pake uit.

Saya termasuk baru dengan game ini. Baru gabung lr dr bulan Februari tahun ini. Itu semua murni free dr gacha atau spin di ss. Saya pikir lebih bisa menikmati game jika tidak pake duit.

Sekalian latihan kesabaran. Postingan apa ini Dear Rangers, Saya menulis artikel ini bukan untuk menjelek-jelekkan pihak dev LR, tapi sekedar menyajikan kebenaran.

Hati-hati membaca artikel ini, kalo kamu ga kuat 'iman', bisa-bisa kamu memutuskan untuk pensiun bermain Line Rangers.

Labels: Info , OOT. Anonymous March 28, at AM. Anonymous March 28, at PM. Muzakki Nadfi March 28, at PM. Unknown March 28, at PM. Unknown March 29, at PM.

Unknown March 31, at AM. Newbie March 28, at PM. Unknown March 30, at PM. Unknown April 8, at AM.

Anonymous March 29, at AM. Anonymous March 29, at PM. Compressed in the heat of battle, its troops could only primarily fight facing forward.

The diversity of troops gave the phalanx great flexibility, but this diversity was a double-edged sword, relying on a mix of units that was complicated to control and position.

These included not only the usual heavy infantrymen, cavalry and light infantry but also various elite units, medium armed groups, foreign contingents with their own styles and shock units of war-elephants.

If properly organized and fighting together a long time under capable leaders, they could be very proficient. The campaigns of Alexander and Pyrrhus a Hellenic-style formation of mixed contingents show this.

Without such long-term cohesion and leadership, however, their performance was uneven. By the time the Romans were engaging against Hellenistic armies, the Greeks had ceased to use strong flank guards and cavalry contingents, and their system had degenerated into a mere clash of phalanxes.

This was the formation overcome by the Romans at the Battle of Cynoscephalae. Advantages of Roman infantry.

The Romans themselves had retained some aspects of the classical phalanx not to be confused with the Macedonian phalanx in their early legions, most notably the final line of fighters in the classic "triple line", the spearmen of the triarii.

The long pikes of the triarii were to eventually disappear, and all hands were uniformly equipped with short sword, shield and pilum, and deployed in the distinctive Roman tactical system, which provided more standardization and cohesion in the long run over the Hellenic type formations.

Phalanxes facing the legion were vulnerable to the more flexible Roman "checkerboard" deployment, which provided each fighting man a good chunk of personal space to engage in close order fighting.

The manipular system also allowed entire Roman sub-units to manoeuvre more widely, freed from the need to always remain tightly packed in rigid formation.

The deep three-line deployment of the Romans allowed combat pressure to be steadily applied forward. Most phalanxes favoured one huge line several ranks deep.

This might do well in the initial stages, but as the battle entangled more and more men, the stacked Roman formation allowed fresh pressure to be imposed over a more extended time.

As combat lengthened and the battlefield compressed, the phalanx might thus become exhausted or rendered immobile, while the Romans still had enough left to not only manoeuvre but to make the final surges forward.

Hannibal's arrangement had much to recommend it given his weakness in cavalry and infantry, but he made no provision for one line relieving the other as the Romans did.

Each line fought its own lonely battle and the last ultimately perished when the Romans reorganized for a final surge.

The legions also drilled and trained together over a more extended time, and were more uniform and streamlined, unlike Hannibal's final force and others enabling even less than brilliant army commanders to manoeuvre and position their forces proficiently.

These qualities, among others, made them more than a match for the phalanx, when they met in combat. The Greek king Pyrrhus' phalangical system was to prove a tough trial for the Romans.

Despite several defeats, the Romans inflicted such losses on the Epirote army that the phrase " Pyrrhic victory " has become a byword for a victory won at a terrible cost.

A skilful and experienced commander, Pyrrhus deployed a typically mixed phalanx system, including shock units of war-elephants, and formations of light infantry peltasts , elite units, and cavalry to support his infantry.

Using these he was able to defeat the Romans twice, with a third battle deemed inconclusive or a limited Roman tactical success by many scholars.

The battles below see individual articles for detailed accounts illustrate the difficulties of fighting against phalanx forces. If well-led and deployed compare Pyrrhus to the fleeing Perseus at Pydna below , they presented a credible infantry alternative to the heavy legion.

The Romans, however, were to learn from their mistakes. In subsequent battles after the Pyrrhic wars, they showed themselves masters of the Hellenic phalanx.

In this battle the Macedonian phalanx originally held the high ground but all of its units had not been properly positioned due to earlier skirmishing.

Nevertheless, an advance by its left-wing drove back the Romans, who counterattacked on the right flank and made some progress against a somewhat disorganized Macedonian left.

However, the issue was still in doubt until an unknown tribune officer detached 20 maniples from the Roman line and made an encircling attack against the Macedonian rear.

This caused the enemy phalanx to collapse, securing a route for the Romans. The more flexible, streamlined legionary organization had exploited the weaknesses of the densely packed phalanx.

Such triumphs secured Roman hegemony in Greece and adjoining lands. At Pydna the contenders deployed on a relatively flat plain, and the Macedonians had augmented the infantry with a sizeable cavalry contingent.

At the hour of decision, the enemy phalanx advanced in formidable array against the Roman line and made some initial progress. However, the ground it had to advance over was rough, and the powerful phalangial formation lost its tight cohesion.

The Romans absorbed the initial shock and came on into the fray, where their more spacious formation and continuously applied pressure proved decisive in hand-to-hand combat on the rough ground.

Shield and sword at close quarters on such terrain neutralized the long pike , and supplementary Macedonian weapons lighter armour and a dagger-like short sword made an indifferent showing against the skilful and aggressive assault of the heavy Roman infantrymen.

The opposition also failed to deploy supporting forces effectively to help the phalanx at its time of dire need.

Indeed, the Macedonian commander, Perseus, seeing the situation deteriorating, seems to have fled without even bringing his cavalry into the engagement.

The affair was decided in less than two hours, with a comprehensive defeat for the Macedonians. When the Romans faced phalangite armies, the legions often deployed the velites in front of the enemy with the command to contendite vestra sponte attack , presumably with their javelins, to cause confusion and panic in the solid blocks of phalanxes.

Meanwhile, auxilia archers were deployed on the wings of the legion in front of the cavalry , in order to defend their withdrawal. These archers were ordered to eiaculare flammas , fire incendiary arrows into the enemy.

The cohorts then advanced in a wedge formation , supported by the velites' and auxiliaries' fire, and charged into the phalanx at a single point, breaking it, then flanking it with the cavalry to seal the victory.

See the Battle of Beneventum for evidence of fire-arrows being used. Tactical superiority of Hannibal's forces. While not a classic phalanx force, Hannibal's army was composed of "mixed" contingents and elements common to Hellenic formations, and it is told that towards the end of his life, Hannibal reportedly named Pyrrhus as the commander of the past that he most admired [37] Rome however had blunted Pyrrhus' hosts prior to the rise of Hannibal, and given their advantages in organization, discipline, and resource mobilization, why did they not make a better showing in the field against the Carthaginian, who throughout most of his campaign in Italy suffered from numerical inferiority and lack of support from his homeland?

Hannibal's individual genius, the steadiness of his core troops forged over several years of fighting together in Spain, and later in Italy and his cavalry arm seem to be the decisive factors.

Time after time Hannibal exploited the tendencies of the Romans, particularly their eagerness to close and achieve a decisive victory.

The cold, tired, wet legionnaires that slogged out of the Trebia River to form up on the river bank are but one example of how Hannibal forced or manipulated the Romans into fighting on his terms, and on the ground of his own choosing.

The later debacles at Lake Trasimene and Cannae , forced the proud Romans to avoid battle, shadowing the Carthaginians from the high ground of the Apennines, unwilling to risk a significant engagement on the plains where the enemy cavalry held sway.

Growing Roman tactical sophistication and ability to adapt overcome earlier disasters. But while the case of Hannibal underscored that the Romans were far from invincible, it also demonstrated their long-term strengths.

Rome had a vast manpower surplus far outnumbering Hannibal that gave them more options and flexibility. They isolated and eventually bottled up the Carthaginians and hastened their withdrawal from Italy with the constant manoeuvre.

More importantly, they used their manpower resources to launch an offensive into Spain and Africa. They were willing to absorb the humiliation in Italy and remain on the strategic defensive, but with typical relentless persistence they struck elsewhere, to finally crush their foes.

They also learned from those enemies. The operations of Scipio were an improvement on some of those who had previously faced Hannibal, showing a higher level of advance thinking, preparation and organization.

Compare with Sempronius at the Battle of the Trebia River for example. Scipio's contribution was in part to implement more flexible manoeuvre of tactical units, instead of the straight-ahead, three-line grind favoured by some contemporaries.

He also made better use of cavalry, traditionally an arm in which the Romans were lacking. His operations also included pincer movements, a consolidated battle line, and "reverse Cannae" formations and cavalry movements.

His victories in Spain and the African campaign demonstrated a new sophistication in Roman warfare and reaffirmed the Roman capacity to adapt, persist and overcome.

Views of the Gallic enemies of Rome have varied widely. Some older histories consider them to be backward savages, ruthlessly destroying the civilization and "grandeur that was Rome.

Often their bravery is celebrated as worthy adversaries of Rome. See the Dying Gaul for an example. The Gallic opposition was also composed of a large number of different peoples and tribes, geographically ranging from the mountains of Switzerland to the lowlands of France and thus are not easy to categorize.

The term "Gaul" has also been used interchangeably to describe Celtic peoples farther afield in Britain adding even more to the diversity of peoples lumped together under this name.

From a military standpoint, however, they seem to have shared certain general characteristics: tribal polities with a relatively small and lesser elaborated state structure, light weaponry, fairly unsophisticated tactics and organization, a high degree of mobility, and inability to sustain combat power in their field forces over a lengthy period.

Though popular accounts celebrate the legions and an assortment of charismatic commanders quickly vanquishing massive hosts of "wild barbarians", [40] Rome suffered a number of early defeats against such tribal armies.

As early as the Republican period circa — BC , they had sacked Rome under Brennus , and had won several other victories such as the Battle of Noreia and the Battle of Arausio.

Henceforth, July 18 was considered an unlucky date on the Roman Calendar. Some writers suggest that as a result of such debacles, the expanding Roman power began to adjust to this vigorous, fast-moving new enemy.

The circular hoplite shield was also enlarged and eventually replaced with the rectangular scutum for better protection.

The heavy phalanx spear was replaced by the pila, suitable for throwing. Only the veterans of the triarii retained the long spear- vestige of the former phalanx.

Such early reforms also aided the Romans in their conquest of the rest of Italy over such foes as the Samnites, Latins and Greeks.

In the early imperial period, however, Germanic warbands inflicted one of Rome's greatest military defeats, the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest which saw the destruction of three imperial legions and was to place a limit on Roman expansion in the West.

And it was these Germanic tribes in part most having some familiarity with Rome and its culture, and becoming more Romanized themselves that were to eventually bring about the Roman military's final demise in the West.

Ironically, in the final days, the bulk of the fighting was between forces composed mostly of barbarians on either side. Whatever their particular culture, the Gallic and Germanic tribes generally proved themselves to be tough opponents, racking up several victories over their enemies.

Some historians show that they sometimes used massed fighting in tightly packed phalanx-type formations with overlapping shields, and employed shield coverage during sieges.

In open battle, they sometimes used a triangular "wedge" style formation in attack. Their greatest hope of success lay in 4 factors: a numerical superiority, b surprising the Romans via an ambush for example or in c advancing quickly to the fight, or d engaging the Romans over heavily covered or difficult terrain where units of the fighting horde could shelter within striking distance until the hour of decision, or if possible, withdraw and regroup between successive charges.

Most significant Gallic and Germanic victories show two or more of these characteristics. The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest contains all four: numerical superiority, surprise, quick charges to close rapidly, and favorable terrain and environmental conditions thick forest and pounding rainstorms that hindered Roman movement and gave the warriors enough cover to conceal their movements and mount successive attacks against the Roman line.

Another factor in the Romans' defeat was a treacherous defection by Arminius and his contingent. Weaknesses in organization and equipment. Against the fighting men from the legion however, the Gauls, Iberians and Germanic forces faced a daunting task.

The barbarians' rudimentary organization and tactics fared poorly against the well-oiled machinery that was the Legion. The fierceness of the Gallic and Germanic charges is often commented upon by some writers, and in certain circumstances, they could overwhelm Roman lines.

Nevertheless, the in-depth Roman formation allowed adjustments to be made, and the continual application of forwarding pressure made long-term combat a hazardous proposition for the Gauls.

Flank attacks were always possible, but the legion was flexible enough to pivot to meet this, either through sub-unit manoeuvre or through the deployment of lines farther back.

The cavalry screen on the flanks also added another layer of security, as did nightly regrouping in fortified camps.

The Gauls and Germans also fought with little or no armour and with weaker shields, putting them at a disadvantage against the legion.

Other items of Roman equipment from studded sandals, to body armour, to metal helmets added to Roman advantages. Generally speaking, the Gauls and Germans needed to get into good initial position against the Romans and to overwhelm them in the early phases of the battle.

An extended set-piece slogging match between the lightly armed tribesmen and the well-organized heavy legionaries usually spelt doom for the tribal fighters.

Weaknesses in logistics. Roman logistics also provided a trump card against Germanic foes as it had against so many previous foes. Tacitus in his Annals reports that the Roman commander Germanicus recognized that continued operations in Gaul would require long trains of men and material to come overland, where they would be subject to attack as they traversed the forests and swamps.

He, therefore, opened sea and river routes, moving large quantities of supplies and reinforcements relatively close to the zone of battle, bypassing the dangerous land routes.

In addition, the Roman fortified camps provided secure staging areas for offensive, defensive and logistical operations, once their troops were deployed.

Assault roads and causeways were constructed on the marshy ground to facilitate manoeuvre, sometimes under direct Gallic attack. These Roman techniques repeatedly defeated their Germanic adversaries.

The Gallic also demonstrated a high level of tactical prowess in some areas. Gallic chariot warfare, for example, showed a high degree of integration and coordination with infantry, and Gallic horse and chariot assaults sometimes threatened Roman forces in the field with annihilation.

At the Battle of Sentinum for example, c. The discipline of the Roman infantry restored the line, however, and a counterattack eventually defeated the Gallic forces and their allies.

The accounts of Polybius leading up to the Battle of Telamon , c. The Gauls met comprehensive defeat by the Roman legions under Papus and Regulus.

Chariot forces also attacked the legions as they were disembarking from ships during Caesar's invasion of Britain, but the Roman commander drove off the fast-moving assailants using covering fire slings, arrows and engines of war from his ships and reinforcing his shore party of infantry to charge and drive off the attack.

During the clash, the chariots would drop off their warriors to attack the enemy and retire a short distance away, massed in reserve.

From this position, they could retrieve the assault troops if the engagement was going badly, or apparently, pick them up and deploy elsewhere.

Caesar's troops were discomfited by one such attack, and he met it by withdrawing into his fortified redoubt.

A later Gallic attack against the Roman camp was routed. Superb as the Gallic fighters were, chariots were already declining as an effective weapon of war in the ancient world with the rise of mounted cavalry.

However, they were no longer used in an offensive role but primarily for the pre-battle show - riding back and forth and hurling insults.

The main encounter was decided by infantry and mounted cavalry. Superior Gallic mobility and numbers often troubled Roman arms, whether deployed in decades-long mobile or guerrilla warfare or in decisive field engagement.

The near-defeat of Caesar in his Gallic campaign confirms this latter pattern but also shows the strengths of Roman tactical organization and discipline.

At the Battle of the Sabis river, see more detailed article contingents of the Nervii , Atrebates, Veromandui and Aduatuci tribes massed secretly in the surrounding forests as the main Roman force was busy making camp on the opposite side of the river.

Some distance away behind them slogged two slow-moving legions with the baggage train. Engaged in foraging and camp construction the Roman forces were somewhat scattered.

As camp building commenced, the barbarian forces launched a ferocious attack, streaming across the shallow water and quickly assaulting the distracted Romans.

This incident is discussed in Caesar's Gallic War Commentaries. So far the situation looked promising for the warrior host.

Early progress was spectacular as the initial Roman dispositions were driven back. A rout looked possible. Caesar himself rallied sections of his endangered army, impressing resolve upon the troops.

With their customary discipline and cohesion, the Romans then began to drive back the barbarian assault. A charge by the Nervi tribe through a gap between the legions however almost turned the tide again, as the onrushing warriors seized the Roman camp and tried to outflank the other army units engaged with the rest of the tribal host.

The initial phase of the clash had passed however and a slogging match ensued. The arrival of the two rear legions that had been guarding the baggage reinforced the Roman lines.

Led by the 10th Legion, a counterattack was mounted with these reinforcements that broke the back of the barbarian effort and sent the tribesmen reeling in retreat.

It was a close-run thing, illustrating both the fighting prowess of the tribal forces and the steady, disciplined cohesion of the Romans.

Ultimately, the latter was to prove decisive in Rome's long fought conquest of Gaul. As noted above, the fierce charge of the Gauls and their individual prowess is frequently acknowledged by several ancient Roman writers.

Under their war leader Vercingetorix , the Gallic pursued what some modern historians have termed a "persisting" or "logistics strategy" - a mobile approach relying not on direct open field clashes, but avoidance of major battle, "scorched earth" denial of resources, and the isolation and piecemeal destruction of Roman detachments and smaller unit groupings.

According to Caesar himself, during the siege of the town of Bourges, the lurking warbands of Gauls were:. Caesar countered with a strategy of enticing the Gallic forces out into open battle, or of blockading them into submission.

At the town of Gergovia, resource denial was combined with a concentration of superior force and multiple threats from more than one direction.

This caused the opposing Roman forces to divide and ultimately fail. Gergovia was situated on the high ground of a tall hill, and Vercingetorix carefully drew up the bulk of his force on the slope, positioning allied tribes in designated places.

He drilled his men and skirmished daily with the Romans, who had overrun a hilltop position and had created a small camp some distance from Caesar's larger main camp.

A rallying of about 10, disenchanted Aeudan tribesmen engineered by Vercingetorix's agents created a threat in Caesar's rear, including a threat to a supply convoy promised by the allied Aeudans, and he diverted four legions to meet this danger.

Caesar dealt with the real threat, turned around and by ruthlessly forced marching once again consolidated his forces at the town.

A feint using bogus cavalry by the Romans drew off part of the Gallic assault, and the Romans advanced to capture three more enemy outposts on the slope, and proceeded towards the walls of the stronghold.

The diverted Gallic forces returned however and in frantic fighting outside the town walls, the Romans lost men, including 46 centurions. Caesar commenced a retreat from the town with the victorious Gallic warriors in pursuit.

The Roman commander, however, mobilized his 10th Legion as a blocking force to cover his withdrawal and after some fighting, the tribesmen themselves withdrew back to Gergovia, taking several captured legion standards.

The vicious fighting around Gergovia was the first time Caesar had suffered a military reverse, demonstrating the Gallic martial valor noted by the ancient chroniclers.

The hard battle is referenced by the Roman historian Plutarch, who writes of the Averni people showing visitors a sword in one of their temples, a weapon that reputedly belonged to Caesar himself.

According to Plutarch, the Roman general was shown the sword in the temple at Gergovia some years after the battle, but he refused to reclaim it, saying that it was consecrated, and to leave it where it was.

The Gallic were unable to sustain their strategy, however, and Vercingetorix was to become trapped in Alesia, facing not divided sections or detachments of the Roman Army but Caesar's full force of approximately 70, men 50, legionnaires plus numerous additional auxiliary cavalry and infantry.

This massive concentration of Romans was able to besiege the fortress in detail and repulse Gallic relief forces, and it fell in little more than a month.

As historian A. Goldsworthy notes: "His [Vercingetorix's] strategy was considerably more sophisticated than that employed by Caesar's earlier opponents..

The Gauls gave battle at a place where they were inadequately provisioned for an extended siege, and where Caesar could bring his entire field force to bear on a single point without them being dissipated, and where his lines of supply were not effectively interdicted.

Together with a strong defensive anvil, the town supported by an offensive hammer the open field forces , and coupled with previous resource denial pressure over time, the Romans were forced to retreat, and the Gallic secured a victory.

As one historian notes about the persisting strategy:. In their battles against a wide variety of opponents, Rome's ruthless persistence, greater resources and stronger organization wore down their opponents over time.

Opponents could be relentlessly weakened and exhausted over the long run. As long as the Roman Senate and its successors were willing to replace and expend more men and material decade after decade, victory could be bought through a strategy of exhaustion.

The systematic wastage and destruction of enemy economic and human resources were called vastatio by the Romans.

Crops and animals were destroyed or carried off, and local populaces were massacred or enslaved. Sometimes these tactics were also used to conduct punitive raids on barbarian tribes which had performed raids across the border.

In the campaigns of Germanicus, Roman troops in the combat area carried out a "scorched earth" approach against their Germanic foes, devastating the land they depended on for supplies.

The Roman commander Severus avoided meeting the hard-fighting Jewish rebels in the open field. Instead, he relied on attacking their fortified strongpoints and devastating the zone of conflict in a methodical campaign.

Some historians note however that Rome often balanced brutal attrition with shrewd diplomacy, as demonstrated by Caesar's harsh treatment of Gallic tribes that opposed him, but his sometimes conciliatory handling of those that submitted.

Rome also used a variety of incentives to encourage cooperation by the elites of conquered peoples, co-opting opposition and incorporating them into the structure of the empire.

This carrot and stick approach forms an integral part of "the Roman way" of war. The Romans understood this concept very well and realized that training soldiers could include paying for his rations [food] , his salary, his armour, his armaments [weapons] , and a soldier's honorarium [which was paid to those who received honourable discharges].

With all this in perspective, they realized each individual soldier was a far too valuable resource to waste. They knew the costs they were incurring for each soldier had to be quite similar on their enemy's side.

So they developed a tactic that could cause a significant setback or even defeat for their enemy while only creating a limited risk for their own soldiers.

The basic principle behind these tactics was to disrupt their enemies' resources while increasing Roman resources. Without a regular supply of food, water, and other commodities, armies would begin to starve or dehydrate, resulting in low morale or killing of fellow soldiers.

Cavalry opponents were one of the toughest challenges faced by the Roman infantry. Combining both missile and shock capability with extensive mobility, cavalry exploited the inherent weakness of the legion—its relatively slow movement and deployment.

Defeat by strong cavalry forces is a recurring event in Roman military history. Hannibal's great victory at Cannae considered one of the greatest Roman defeats ever was primarily an infantry struggle, but the key role was played by his cavalry, as in his other victories.

An even more dramatic demonstration of Roman vulnerability is shown in the numerous wars against Parthian heavy cavalry.

Both types of troops used powerful composite bows that shot arrows of sufficient strength to penetrate Roman armour. The cataphracts extended combat power by serving as shock troops, engaging opposing forces with their heavy lances in thundering charges after they had been "softened up" by swarms of arrows.

The Parthians also conducted a "scorched earth" policy against the Romans, refusing major set-piece encounters, while luring them deeper on to the unfavorable ground, where they would lack water supplies and a secure line of retreat.

The debacle of the Battle of Carrhae saw a devastating defeat of Roman arms by the Parthian cavalry. Roman casualties were approcimately 20, killed and 10, captured making the battle one of the costliest defeats in Roman history.

Parthian casualties were minimal. Clues exist in the earlier campaigns of Alexander the Great against mounted Asiatic warriors—engaging the horsemen with strong detachments of light infantry and missile troops and driving them off with charges by Alexander's heavy cavalry units.

The Roman variant, with its large manpower resources, continued the same "combined arms" approach, with a larger role for cavalry as the empire went on.

The Eastern half of the Roman Empire , particularly, was ultimately to rely mostly on cavalry forces. Adjustments of Ventidius.

The operations of the Roman commander Publius Ventidius Bassus illustrate three general tactics used by the infantry to fight their mounted foes.

These drew on Caesar's veteran legions and made Ventidius one of the Roman generals to celebrate a triumph against the Parthians.

In three separate battles, he not only managed to defeat the Parthian armies and drive them out of the Roman territory but also managed to kill Parthia's three top military commanders during the battles.

Combined arms and quick advance in later eras. In the later Roman empire, cavalry forces played a larger role, with the infantry in support.

On June 22, a large-scale clash occurred near the town of Maranga. Facing an enemy that threatened to blanket his troops with a hail of arrows, and in danger of envelopment, Julian deployed his force in a crescent formation, and ordered an advance by both infantry and cavalry on the double, thwarting both dangers by closing quickly.

The gambit was successful. After a long battle, the Persians withdrew- a tactical victory albeit a costly one for the Romans according to some historians.

Marcellinus's commentary also sharply contrasts the fighting spirit of the Persian infantrymen with those of Rome, stating that they had "aversion to pitched infantry battles.

Mixed results against major cavalry enemies. Rome's overall record against the Parthians was favourable, although the Parthian horsemen offered stiff resistance, as it was against the horsemen of Hannibal, and some Gallic opponents.

Subsequent Roman leaders like Antony invaded Parthian territory but had to withdraw after severe losses. Others like Severus and Trajan saw great success in their invasions of Mesopotamia, defeating Parthian armies through combined arms tactics.

Any history of the Roman infantry must grapple with the factors that led to the decline of the heavy legions that once dominated the Western world.

Such decline, of course, is closely linked with the decay of other facets of Rome's economy, society and political scene. Nevertheless, some historians emphasize that the final demise of Rome was due to military defeat, however plausible or implausible the plethora of theories advanced by some scholars, ranging from declining tax bases, to class struggle, to mass lead poisoning.

There are a number of controversies in this area with duelling scholars advancing competing theories. Essentially it is argued that the increasing barbarization of the heavy legions weakened weaponry, training, morale and military effectiveness in the long run.

The weapons changes described above are but one example. It could be argued that the use of barbarian personnel was nothing new.

This is accurate, however, such use was clearly governed by "the Roman way. In the twilight of the empire, this was not the case.

Such practices as permitting the settlement of massive, armed barbarian populations on Roman territory, the watering down of the privilege of citizenship, increasing use of alien contingents, and relaxation or removal of traditionally thorough and severe Roman discipline, organization and control, contributed to the decline of the heavy infantry.

The settlement of the foederati for example, saw large barbarian contingents ushered on to Roman territory, with their own organization, under their own leaders.

Such groupings showed a tendency to neglect "the Roman way" in organization, training, logistics etc. These settlements may have bought short-term political peace for imperial elites, but their long-term effect was negative, weakening the traditional strengths of the heavy infantry in discipline, training and deployment.

They also seemed to have lessened the incentive for remaining "old Guard" troops to adhere to such strengths, since the barbarians received equal or more favour with less effort.

Indeed, such "allied" barbarian contingents were at times to turn on the Romans, devastating wide areas with sack and pillage and even attacking imperial army formations.

Changes to the Roman forces that moved away from the old fighting organization order were thus the outcome of several influences, rather than simply the appearance of more, allegedly uncivilized non-Romans.

To combat the more frequent raids and advances of their hostile neighbours the legions were changed from slow and heavy to much lighter troops, and cavalry was introduced as a serious concept.

State-controlled factories produced vast quantities of less specialist arms such as chainmail armour and spears as opposed to the gladius and lorica segmentata more prevalent in the early empire.

The difference between auxiliaries and legionaries began to become negligible from an equipment point of view.

This meant that the new subdivided infantry lost the awesome power that the earlier legions had, meaning that whilst they were more likely to see a battle they were less likely to win it.

That legion size was at an all-time low was also a factor. On the other hand, legions in the late empire were used far more flexibly as accounts by authors like Ammianus Marcellinus make clear.

Smaller detachments waged more personal and smaller scale, yet intense operations against tribal foes on the Rhine and Danubian frontiers.

Instead of vast formations of thousands of troops, smaller units would engage smaller-scale incursions by raiders. Roman horsemen , while fast, were actually much too weak to cope with the very cavalry based invasions of the Huns, Goths, Vandals and Sassanids.

Their ineffectiveness was demonstrated at Cannae and Adrianople ; in both instances, the cavalry was completely destroyed by a vastly more powerful enemy horse.

Advances in Roman tactical thinking led to the adoption of eastern-style cataphracts and mass-use of auxiliary forces as cavalry, both of which were used to address previous shortcomings of the Roman army.

The later Roman army was more cavalry-orientated than it had been before and as a result, detachments were able to be moved around the empire at will, ending the previous doctrine of keeping all forces on the frontiers at the edge of the empire.

The "mobile reserve" strategy, traditionally identified with Constantine I , saw a reversal of the traditional "forward" policy of strong frontier fortifications backed by legions stationed near likely zones of conflict.

Instead, it is argued that the best troops were pulled back into a type of "mobile reserve" closer to the centre that could be deployed to trouble areas throughout the empire.

Some scholars claim this was a positive development, Luttwak, Delbruck , et al. Some writers such as Luttwak condemn the old-style "forward" policy as indicating a " Maginot Line " mentality in the troubled latter centuries of the Empire.

Ancient writers like Zosimus in the 5th century AD condemned the "reserve" policy as a major weakening of the military force.

Other modern scholars Ferrill et al. While the drop in quality did not happen immediately, it is argued that over time, the limitanei declined into lightly armed, static watchman type troops that were of dubious value against increasing barbarian marauders on the frontiers.

The pullback of the best infantry was based more on political reasons shoring up the power bases of the emperors and various elites rather than on military reality.

In addition, it is claimed, the "forward" policy was not at all a static "Maginot" approach, but that traditional heavy legions and supporting cavalry could still move to a trouble spot by redeploying them from fortifications elsewhere along a particular frontier.

Some scholars challenge the notion that a "mobile reserve" in the modern military sense existed in the Roman Empire, and instead argue that the shifts in an organization represent a series of field armies deployed in various areas as needed, particularly in the East.

Others point to the heavy fiscal difficulties and political turmoil of the later Empire that made it difficult to continue a traditional policy.

There are numerous other facets to the controversy, but whatever the school of thought, all agree that the traditional strengths and weaponry of the heavy infantry legion declined from the standards of earlier eras.

The 4th-century writer Vegetius , in one of the most influential Western military works De Re Militari , highlighted this decline as the key factor in military weakness, noting that the core legions always fought as part of an integrated team of cavalry and light foot.

In the latter years, this formula that had brought so much success petered out. This does not mean that heavy units disappeared entirely, but that their mass recruitment, formation, organization and deployment as the dominant part of the Roman military was greatly reduced.

Ironically, in Rome's final battles the Western half of the empire the defeats suffered were substantially inflicted by infantry forces many fighting dismounted.

Speaking of the decline of the heavy infantry, the Roman historian Vegetius lauded the old fighting units, and lamented how the heavy armour of the early days had been discarded by the weaker, less disciplined, barbarized forces:.

Historian Arther Ferrill notes that even towards the end, some of the old infantry formations were still in use. Such grouping was increasingly ineffective, however, without the severe close order discipline, drill and organization of old times.

He ordered his troops to ignore them and to attack the powerful Alans and Visigoths instead. It was a sad commentary on the force that had once dominated Europe, the Mediterranean and much of the Middle East.

Nevertheless, its day had already passed in favour of the mass levies of the barbarian federates. Some elements that made the Romans an effective military force, both tactically and at higher levels, were:.

The Romans were able to copy and adapt the weapons and methods of their opponents more effectively.

Some weapons, such as the gladius , were adopted outright by the legionaries. Publius asserts that the pilum was of Samnite origin, and the shield was based on Greek design.

In the naval sphere, the Romans followed some of the same methods they used with the infantry, dropping their ineffective designs and copying, adapting and improving on Punic warships, and introducing heavier marine contingents infantry fighters on to their ships.

Roman organization was more flexible than those of many opponents. Compared to the tightly packed spearmen of the phalanx, the Roman heavy infantry, through their training and discipline, and operating in conjunction with light foot and cavalry, could quickly adopt a number of methods and formations depending on the situation.

These range from the Testudo formation during siege warfare , to a hollow square against cavalry attack, to mixed units of heavy foot, horse and light infantry against guerrillas in Spain, to the classic "triple line" or checkerboard patterns.

Against more sophisticated opponents the Romans also showed great flexibility at times, such as the brilliant adjustments Scipio made against Hannibal at Zama.

These included leaving huge gaps in the ranks to trap the charging elephants, and the recall, reposition and consolidation of a single battle line that advanced to the final death struggle against the Carthaginian veterans of Italy.

Roman discipline, organization and logistical systemization sustained combat effectiveness over a longer period. Notably, the Roman system of castra , or fortified camps, allowed the army to stay in the field on favourable ground and be rested and resupplied for battle.

Well organized Roman logistics also sustained combat power, from routine resupply and storage to the construction of military roads, to state-run arsenals and weapons factories, to well organized naval convoys that helped stave off defeat by Carthage.

The death of a leader generally did not cause the legions to lose heart in battle. Others stepped to the fore and carried on. In the defeat by Hannibal at the River Trebia , 10, Romans cut their way through the debacle to safety, maintaining unit cohesion when all around was rout, a testimony to their tactical organization and discipline.

The Romans were more persistent and more willing to absorb and replace losses over time than their opponents. Unlike other civilizations, the Romans kept going relentlessly until typically their enemies had been completely crushed or neutralized.

The army acted to implement policy and were not allowed to stop unless they received a command from the emperor or a decree from the senate.

Against the tribal polities of Europe, particularly in Hispania , Roman tenacity and material weight eventually wore down most opposition.

The tribes of Europe did not have a state or economic structure able to support lengthy campaigns and therefore could often but not always be made to change their minds about opposing Roman hegemony.

The defeat in the Teutoburg Forest might seem like an exception, but even here, the Romans were back on the warpath 5 years later with major forces against their Germanic opponents.

That their persistence was not actually endless does not negate the general pattern. Where the Romans faced another large state structure, such as the Parthian Empire, they found the military road rocky indeed and were sometimes forced to an impasse.

Nevertheless, the distinct pattern of Roman tenacity holds. Rome suffered its greatest defeats against sophisticated Carthage, notably at Cannae, and was forced to avoid a battle for a lengthy period.

Yet in time, it rebuilt its forces on land and at sea, and persisted in the struggle, astonishing the Punics who expected it to sue for peace.

Against the Parthians, crushing defeats did not stop the Romans from inflicting serious defeats on the Parthians themselves, for they invaded Parthian territory several times afterwards, and though Parthia proper was never totally conquered, Rome ultimately secured a rough hegemony in the area and managed to successfully destroy Parthian forces in Mesopotamia on numerous occasions.

Roman leadership was mixed, but over time it was often effective in securing Roman military success. Leadership debacles are common in Roman military history, from the routs against Hannibal to the demise of the unlucky Crassus against the Parthians.

Double Triple Chance Taktik Ich habe für dich die besten Triple Chance Tricks zusammengestellt. Im Sunmaker Casino kannst du kostenlos und ohne Anmeldung spielen! 18+, AGB gelten. Double Triple Chance mit Echtgeld spielen ▷ Der Merkur-Klassiker kann nicht Um eine möglichst rentable Taktik aufzustellen, solltet ihr folgende Tipps und. Suchen Sie nach Double Triple Chance kostenlos ohne Anmeldung ✓? Wenn Sie taktisch klug riskieren und ihren Gewinn teilweise realisieren können Sie. Both types of troops used powerful composite bows that shot arrows of sufficient strength to penetrate Tapporo armour. Subsequent Roman leaders like Antony invaded Parthian territory but had to withdraw after severe losses. The overall size of the legion and length of the soldier's service also increased on a more permanent basis. Its "dense pack" approach also made it rigid. Caesar countered with a strategy of enticing the Gallic forces out into open battle, or of blockading them into submission.

Double Triple Chance Taktik Video

Double Triple Chance zocken!! 19 mal Spitze + Vollbild auf 2 Euro Jackpot *Kiel Gaarden*

888 POKER BONUS PROGRESS WГhlt einfach ein fantastisches Live Dealer Casinos bieten Double Triple Chance Taktik Casino Bonus.

GUTE RESTAURANT STUTTGART Sunnyplayer 8. Auch wenn es im Internet natürlich gerne mal behauptet wird, Www.Jetzspielen.De Kostenlos es natürlich keine Cheats, die direkt zum Rewin-Feature führen. Book Of Ra 3 Download Torent gibt keine komplizierten Features. Bet with your head, not over it!
Free App Store Money Belg Stadt
Double Triple Chance Taktik 277
Wettvorhersagen 425
Double Triple Chance Taktik Bubbl Spinner
Slot Machine Gratis In 3d Free Bonus No Deposit Casino Slots
EINFACHE FIGUREN Merke : Einen konkreten Triple Chance Bonus gibt es nicht. Fans von deutschen Online-Casinos haben bis heute keinen Zugriff Roulette Strategy That Works auf das beliebte Merkur-Portfolio. Zunächst einmal sollte zwischen diesen beiden Begriffen differenziert werden. Während in der klassischen Version beim Glücksrad nur vier Felder zur Verfügung stehen und dreimal gedreht wird, sind es bei Double Triple Chance sieben Felder und es wird sechsmal gedreht.
Wer in Triple Chance online Echtgeld setzen möchte, will nicht unbedingt mit gigantischen Summen einsteigen. In diesem Fall Alice Lounge Einloggen man zum Glücksrad weitergeleitet, Dolphins Pearl Deluxe Online Kostenlos insgesamt vier Felder aufweist. Denn Gewinne sind in einer Spielrunde mehrfach möglich und addieren sich. Da sich die Merkur-Klassiker generell sehr ähnlich sind, könnt ihr unsere Empfehlungen durchaus auch auf andere Titel des Entwicklers übertragen und damit Erfolge erzielen. Unterlassen sollte man es natürlich, Spielautomaten zu manipulieren Betway Casino Roulette Cheats einzusetzen. Darüber hinaus hat man jedoch auch zu jedem Zeitpunkt das Risiko vorm Auge, alles verlieren zu können. Denn ohne den passenden Risikoleiter Trick werden Sie die Euro nicht erreichen. Double Triple Chance ist eines der neuesten Spiele in unserer Sammlung und wir freuen uns es ihnen heute vorstellen zu dürfen. Lizensiert ist das Casino auf der britischen Ca San Telmo of Man. Dieser Gewinn gerät nun auch in den folgenden Bonusrunden nicht in Gefahr. The power of Roman field camps has been Roletten Schrank earlier, but in other actions, the Romans sometimes used trenches to secure their flanks against envelopment when they were outnumbered, as Caesar did during operations in Belgaic Gaul. The cohorts were Neue Rennspiele sub-divided into three manipleswhich in turn were split into two centuries of about 80— men each. The legions also drilled and trained together over a more extended time, and were more uniform and streamlined, unlike Hannibal's final force and others enabling even less than brilliant army commanders to manoeuvre and Greentube Casino their forces proficiently. And it was these Germanic tribes Wer Hat Jungle Camp Gewonnen part most having some familiarity with Rome and its culture, and becoming more Romanized themselves Double Triple Chance Taktik were to eventually bring about the Roman military's final demise in the West. Such early reforms also aided the Romans in their conquest of the rest of Italy over such foes as the Samnites, Latins and Greeks. Unknown March 30, at PM. The Gallic also demonstrated a high level of tactical prowess in some areas. Speaking of the decline Sizzling Hot Games the heavy infantry, the Roman historian Vegetius lauded the old fighting units, and lamented how the Aktien Demokonto armour of the early days had been discarded by the weaker, less disciplined, barbarized forces:. Während dem Re-Win Feature kann man seinen Gewinn bis zu 6 Wismarsche Str Rostock verdoppeln. Melden Sie sich bei Sunmaker via JohnnyBet an. Also Kirschen, Zitronen, Melonen, Pflaumen usw. Wenn ihr einen Gewinn-Spin erzielt habt, könnt ihr euren Erlös über diese Features noch einmal aufstocken. Ganz einfach: Der eigentliche Gewinn für ein Vollbild ist bereits sehr attraktiv Einsatz x Die genaue Höhe vom Bonus ist abhängig von der Höhe der ersten Einzahlung. Nach unseren Erfahrungen können die Merkur-Spielautomaten oft sogar ohne vorherige Registrierung ausprobiert werden. Fest steht: Triple Chance kann aufgrund seiner Einfachheit sehr gut von Einsteigern genutzt werden. Es ist das einzige Casino, das die Automatenspiele von Merkur im Internet anbietet und lässt dich kostenlos Bdsm Spiele Online ohne Anmeldung spielen. Green Casino 9. Sie zocken mit 2-Euro-Einsatz und spielen im Autoplay-Modus. Das Spielsystem und die Symbolik sind jedoch mit der Grundausführung komplett identisch. Wie bereits erläutert, entscheiden die Spielstrategien des Spielers Baby Spiele Kostenlos Spielen Deutsch den Erfolg am Spielautomaten. Entscheidend für die Gewinne sind die jeweiligen Symbole.

Double Triple Chance Taktik Datenschutzhinweis

Mit dem klassischen Hochdrücken bei Spiele Apps Mit Freunden Chance ist die Risikoleiter gemeint. Bet with your head, not over Book Of Ra App Fur Windows Phone Ob daran was dran ist, kann man mit Sicherheit nicht sagen. Im Sunmaker Casino kannst du sie Triple Chance kostenlos Wett Tricks ohne Anmeldung ausprobieren und zusätzlich Bonusse kassieren. Wenn neun Mal die gleiche Frucht erscheint, gewinnst du Jetzt Spielen Kostenlos. Auch absolute Spielautomatenanfänger verstehen Schnauz Kartenspiel Regeln wie das Spielprinzip aufgebaut ist. Green Casino. Im Hilfebereich hat Sunmaker auch nochmal ganz genau erklärt, wie die Bonusse funktionieren. Insgesamt gibt es acht unterschiedliche Früchte unter anderem Kirschen, Orangen, Zitronen sowie eine Glockedie 7 und die Diamanten als Gewinnsymbol. Hierfür kommen allerdings nur die Fruchtsymbole in Frage. Wählt man die Risikoleiter, erhält Old Marvel Games auch grafisch Palace De Leiter angezeigtwo Live Sport Ru in stufenweisen Abständen immer ein Betrag befindet, der verdoppelt wird. Ihr Formular wurde gespeichert! Dann kann man durch die Risikoleiter bei Triple Chance kostenlos spielen mit hochdrücken, sofern man im Spielgeldmodus spielt. Wer im Internet auf der Suche nach den Game-Klassikern aus dem Hause Merkur ist, wird es nicht unbedingt leicht haben. Wer drei gleiche Gewinnsymbole in einer der fünf Gewinnlinien erreicht, gewinnt.

Double Triple Chance Taktik Triple Chance Online Strategie ausprobieren

Exklusiver Bonus Lapalingo Casino. Die Zeiten stehen also nach wie vor schlecht für deutsche Merkur-Fans. Tipp: Bei der Sunmaker-Registrierung sollte man auch den Bonus nicht unbeachtet lassenden das Casino auf die erste Einzahlung gewährt maximal Euro. Der zusätzliche Clou am Game: Es gibt darüber hinaus Affaire.Com Erfahrung Risikoleiter, mit der Casino Spiele Kostenlos Und Ohne Anmeldung seinen gewonnen Betrag mit etwas Glück vervielfachen kann. Merke : Eine eigene Triple Chance App gibt es derzeit noch nicht. Wer Royal Rumble Winners Chance ohne Anmeldung spielen möchte, kann auch das im Spielgeldmodus bei Sunmaker jederzeit machen.

If they were losing the fight, the 'posterior' century returned to its position creating gaps again. Then the maniples would fall back through the gaps in the principes, who followed the same procedure to form a battle line and charge.

If the principes could not break the enemy, they would retreat behind the triarii and the whole army would leave the battlefield in good order.

According to some writers, the triarii formed a continuous line when they deployed, and their forward movement allowed scattered or discomfited units to rest and reform, to later rejoin the struggle.

The manipular system allowed engaging every kind of enemy even in rough terrain, because the legion had both flexibility and toughness according to the deployment of its lines.

Lack of a strong cavalry corps, however, was a major flaw of the Roman forces. In the later imperial army, the general deployment was very similar, with the cohorts deploying in quincunx pattern.

In a reflection of the earlier placement of the veteran triarii in the rear, the less experienced cohorts - usually the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 6th, and 8th - were in the front; the more experienced cohorts - 1st, 5th, 7th, 9th, and 10th - were placed behind.

The above is only standard procedure and was often modified; for example, at Zama , Scipio deployed his entire legion in a single line to envelop Hannibal 's army just as Hannibal had done at Cannae.

A brief summary of alternative formations known to have been used is shown below:. Hand-to-hand engagement after the release of missile weapons: Once the deployment and initial skirmishing described above took place, the main body of heavy infantry closed the gap and attacked the double.

The front ranks usually cast their pila , and the following ranks hurled theirs over the heads of the front-line fighters.

After the pila were cast, the soldiers then drew their swords and engaged the enemy. Emphasis was on using the shield to provide maximum body coverage, and for pushing enemies, while attacking with their gladius in thrusts and short cuts in clinch , minimizing exposure to the enemy.

In the combat that ensued, Roman discipline, heavy shield, armour and training were to give them important advantages in combat. The acute shock of combat: Some scholars of the Roman infantry maintain that the intense trauma and stress of hand-to-hand combat meant that the contenders did not simply hack at one another continuously until one dropped.

Instead, there were short periods of intense, vicious fighting. If indecisive, the contenders might fall back a short distance to recuperate, and then surge forward to renew the struggle.

Others behind them would be stepping up into the fray meanwhile, engaging new foes or covering their colleagues. The individual warrior could thus count on temporary relief, rather than endless fighting until death or crippling injury.

As the battle progressed, the massive physical and mental stress intensified. The stamina and willpower demanded to make yet one more charge, to make yet one more surge grew even greater.

Use of war machines and covering fire: Many Roman battles, especially during the late empire, were fought with the preparatory fire from catapults , ballistas and onagers.

These war machines, a form of ancient artillery , fired arrows and large stones towards the enemy although many historians question the battlefield effectiveness of such weapons.

Following this barrage, the Roman infantry advanced, in four lines, until they came within 30 meters of the enemy, then they halted, hurled their pila and charged.

If the first line was repelled by the enemy, another line would rapidly resume the attack. Often this rapid sequence of deadly attacks proved the key to victory.

Another common tactic was to taunt the enemy with feigned charges and rapid arrow fire by the auxiliares equites auxiliary cavalry , forcing the enemy into pursuing them, and then leading the enemy into an ambush where they would be counterattacked by Roman heavy infantry and cavalry.

Some ancient sources such as Polybius seem to imply that the legions could fight with gaps in their lines. Yet, most sources seem to admit that more usually a line would form into a solid front.

Various approaches have been taken to reconcile these possibilities with the ancient writings. After the approach marching was complete, it would be extremely difficult to deploy an unbroken army of men for combat across any but the flattest ground without some sort of intervals.

Many ancient armies used gaps of some sort, even the Carthaginians , who typically withdrew their initial skirmishing troops between the spaces before the main event.

Even more loosely organized enemies like the Germanic hosts typically charged in distinct groups with small gaps between them, rather than marching up in a neat line.

Fighting with gaps is thus feasible as writers like Polybius assert. According to those who support the quincunx formation view, what made the Roman approach stand out is that their intervals were generally larger and more systematically organized than those of other ancient armies.

Each gap was covered by maniples or cohorts from lines farther back. Penetration of any significance could not just slip in unmolested. It would not only be mauled as it fought past the gauntlet of the first line but would also clash with aggressive units moving up to plug the space.

One scenario for not using gaps is deployment in a limited space, such as the top of a hill or ravine, where extensive spreading out would not be feasible.

Another is a particular attack formation, such as the wedge discussed above, or an encirclement as at the Battle of Ilipa.

Yet another is a closing phase manoeuvre when a solid line is constructed to make a last, final push as in the battle of Zama.

During the maelstrom of battle, it is also possible that as the units merged into line, the general checkerboard spacing became more compressed or even disappeared, and the fighting would see a more or less solid line engaged with the enemy.

Thus gaps at the beginning of the struggle might tend to vanish in the closing phases. Some historians view the intervals as primarily useful in maneuver.

Before the legionaries closed with the enemy each echelon would form a solid line to engage. If things went badly for the first line, it would retreat through the gaps and the second echelon moved up- again forming a continuous front.

Should they be discomfited, there still remained the veterans of the triarii who let the survivors retreat through the preset gaps. The veterans then formed a continuous front to engage the enemy or provided cover for the retreat of the army as a whole.

The same procedure was followed when the triarii was phased out - intervals for manoeuvre, reforming and recovery- solid line to engage.

The relief was provided by the second and third lines 'filtering' forward to relieve their comrades in small groups, while the exhausted and wounded eased back from the front.

Another unique feature of the Roman infantry was the depth of its spacing. Most ancient armies deployed in shallower formations, particularly phalanx -type forces.

Phalanxes might deepen their ranks heavily to add both stamina and shock power, but their general approach still favoured one massive line, as opposed to the deep three-layer Roman arrangement.

The advantage of the Roman system is that it allowed the continual funnelling or metering of combat power forward over a longer period—massive, steadily renewed pressure to the front—until the enemy broke.

Deployment of the second and third lines required careful consideration by the Roman commander. Deployed too early, and they might get entangled in the frontal fighting and become exhausted.

Deployed too late, and they might be swept away in a rout if the first line began to break. Tight control had to be maintained, hence the 3rd line triarii were sometimes made to squat or kneel , effectively discouraging premature movement to the front.

The Roman commander was thus generally mobile, constantly moving from spot to spot, and often riding back in person to fetch reserves if there was no time for standard messenger service.

A large number of officers in the typical Roman army, and the flexible breakdown into sub-units like cohorts or maniples greatly aided coordination of such moves.

Whatever the actual formation took however, the ominous funnelling or surge of combat power up to the front remained constant:.

Whatever the deployment, the Roman army was marked both by flexibility and strong discipline and cohesion.

Different formations were assumed according to different tactical situations. Oppidum expugnare was the Roman term for besieging cities. It was divided into three phases:.

In campaign after campaign, enormous effort was expended to dig—a job done by the ordinary legionary.

His field pack included a shovel, a dolabra or pickaxe, and a wicker basket for hauling dirt. Some soldiers also carried a type of turf cutter.

With these, they dug trenches, built walls and palisades and constructed assault roads. The operations of Julius Caesar at Alesia are well known.

The Gallic city was surrounded by massive double walls penning in defenders, and keeping out relieving attackers. A network of camps and forts were included in these works.

The inner trench alone was 20 feet 6. The ground was also sown with caltrops of iron barbs at various places to discourage assault. Surprisingly for such an infantry centred battle, Caesar relied heavily on cavalry forces to counter Gallic sorties.

Ironically, many of these were from Germanic tribes who had come to terms earlier. The power of Roman field camps has been noted earlier, but in other actions, the Romans sometimes used trenches to secure their flanks against envelopment when they were outnumbered, as Caesar did during operations in Belgaic Gaul.

In the Brittany region of France, moles and breakwaters were constructed at enormous effort to assault the estuarine strongholds of the Gauls.

Internal Roman fighting between Caesar and Pompey also saw the frequent employment of trenches, counter-trenches, dug-in strong points, and other works as the contenders manoeuvred against each other in field combat.

Nevertheless, they were an integral part of the relentless Roman rise to dominance over large parts of the ancient world. Strengths of the Macedonian phalanx.

Prior to the rise of Rome, the Macedonian phalanx was the premiere infantry force in the Western World. Packed into a dense armoured mass, and equipped with massive pikes 12 to 21 feet 6.

While defensive configurations were sometimes used, the phalanx was most effective when it was moving forward in attack, either in a frontal charge or in "oblique" or echeloned order against an opposing flank, as the victories of Alexander the Great and Theban innovator Epaminondas attest.

When working with other formations—light infantry and cavalry—it was, at its height under Alexander, without peer. Weaknesses of the Macedonian phalanx.

Nevertheless, the Macedonian phalanx had key weaknesses. It had some manoeuvrability, but once a clash was joined this decreased, particularly on rough ground.

Its "dense pack" approach also made it rigid. Compressed in the heat of battle, its troops could only primarily fight facing forward. The diversity of troops gave the phalanx great flexibility, but this diversity was a double-edged sword, relying on a mix of units that was complicated to control and position.

These included not only the usual heavy infantrymen, cavalry and light infantry but also various elite units, medium armed groups, foreign contingents with their own styles and shock units of war-elephants.

If properly organized and fighting together a long time under capable leaders, they could be very proficient. The campaigns of Alexander and Pyrrhus a Hellenic-style formation of mixed contingents show this.

Without such long-term cohesion and leadership, however, their performance was uneven. By the time the Romans were engaging against Hellenistic armies, the Greeks had ceased to use strong flank guards and cavalry contingents, and their system had degenerated into a mere clash of phalanxes.

This was the formation overcome by the Romans at the Battle of Cynoscephalae. Advantages of Roman infantry.

The Romans themselves had retained some aspects of the classical phalanx not to be confused with the Macedonian phalanx in their early legions, most notably the final line of fighters in the classic "triple line", the spearmen of the triarii.

The long pikes of the triarii were to eventually disappear, and all hands were uniformly equipped with short sword, shield and pilum, and deployed in the distinctive Roman tactical system, which provided more standardization and cohesion in the long run over the Hellenic type formations.

Phalanxes facing the legion were vulnerable to the more flexible Roman "checkerboard" deployment, which provided each fighting man a good chunk of personal space to engage in close order fighting.

The manipular system also allowed entire Roman sub-units to manoeuvre more widely, freed from the need to always remain tightly packed in rigid formation.

The deep three-line deployment of the Romans allowed combat pressure to be steadily applied forward. Most phalanxes favoured one huge line several ranks deep.

This might do well in the initial stages, but as the battle entangled more and more men, the stacked Roman formation allowed fresh pressure to be imposed over a more extended time.

As combat lengthened and the battlefield compressed, the phalanx might thus become exhausted or rendered immobile, while the Romans still had enough left to not only manoeuvre but to make the final surges forward.

Hannibal's arrangement had much to recommend it given his weakness in cavalry and infantry, but he made no provision for one line relieving the other as the Romans did.

Each line fought its own lonely battle and the last ultimately perished when the Romans reorganized for a final surge.

The legions also drilled and trained together over a more extended time, and were more uniform and streamlined, unlike Hannibal's final force and others enabling even less than brilliant army commanders to manoeuvre and position their forces proficiently.

These qualities, among others, made them more than a match for the phalanx, when they met in combat. The Greek king Pyrrhus' phalangical system was to prove a tough trial for the Romans.

Despite several defeats, the Romans inflicted such losses on the Epirote army that the phrase " Pyrrhic victory " has become a byword for a victory won at a terrible cost.

A skilful and experienced commander, Pyrrhus deployed a typically mixed phalanx system, including shock units of war-elephants, and formations of light infantry peltasts , elite units, and cavalry to support his infantry.

Using these he was able to defeat the Romans twice, with a third battle deemed inconclusive or a limited Roman tactical success by many scholars.

The battles below see individual articles for detailed accounts illustrate the difficulties of fighting against phalanx forces.

If well-led and deployed compare Pyrrhus to the fleeing Perseus at Pydna below , they presented a credible infantry alternative to the heavy legion.

The Romans, however, were to learn from their mistakes. In subsequent battles after the Pyrrhic wars, they showed themselves masters of the Hellenic phalanx.

In this battle the Macedonian phalanx originally held the high ground but all of its units had not been properly positioned due to earlier skirmishing.

Nevertheless, an advance by its left-wing drove back the Romans, who counterattacked on the right flank and made some progress against a somewhat disorganized Macedonian left.

However, the issue was still in doubt until an unknown tribune officer detached 20 maniples from the Roman line and made an encircling attack against the Macedonian rear.

This caused the enemy phalanx to collapse, securing a route for the Romans. The more flexible, streamlined legionary organization had exploited the weaknesses of the densely packed phalanx.

Such triumphs secured Roman hegemony in Greece and adjoining lands. At Pydna the contenders deployed on a relatively flat plain, and the Macedonians had augmented the infantry with a sizeable cavalry contingent.

At the hour of decision, the enemy phalanx advanced in formidable array against the Roman line and made some initial progress.

However, the ground it had to advance over was rough, and the powerful phalangial formation lost its tight cohesion.

The Romans absorbed the initial shock and came on into the fray, where their more spacious formation and continuously applied pressure proved decisive in hand-to-hand combat on the rough ground.

Shield and sword at close quarters on such terrain neutralized the long pike , and supplementary Macedonian weapons lighter armour and a dagger-like short sword made an indifferent showing against the skilful and aggressive assault of the heavy Roman infantrymen.

The opposition also failed to deploy supporting forces effectively to help the phalanx at its time of dire need. Indeed, the Macedonian commander, Perseus, seeing the situation deteriorating, seems to have fled without even bringing his cavalry into the engagement.

The affair was decided in less than two hours, with a comprehensive defeat for the Macedonians. When the Romans faced phalangite armies, the legions often deployed the velites in front of the enemy with the command to contendite vestra sponte attack , presumably with their javelins, to cause confusion and panic in the solid blocks of phalanxes.

Meanwhile, auxilia archers were deployed on the wings of the legion in front of the cavalry , in order to defend their withdrawal. These archers were ordered to eiaculare flammas , fire incendiary arrows into the enemy.

The cohorts then advanced in a wedge formation , supported by the velites' and auxiliaries' fire, and charged into the phalanx at a single point, breaking it, then flanking it with the cavalry to seal the victory.

See the Battle of Beneventum for evidence of fire-arrows being used. Tactical superiority of Hannibal's forces. While not a classic phalanx force, Hannibal's army was composed of "mixed" contingents and elements common to Hellenic formations, and it is told that towards the end of his life, Hannibal reportedly named Pyrrhus as the commander of the past that he most admired [37] Rome however had blunted Pyrrhus' hosts prior to the rise of Hannibal, and given their advantages in organization, discipline, and resource mobilization, why did they not make a better showing in the field against the Carthaginian, who throughout most of his campaign in Italy suffered from numerical inferiority and lack of support from his homeland?

Hannibal's individual genius, the steadiness of his core troops forged over several years of fighting together in Spain, and later in Italy and his cavalry arm seem to be the decisive factors.

Time after time Hannibal exploited the tendencies of the Romans, particularly their eagerness to close and achieve a decisive victory. The cold, tired, wet legionnaires that slogged out of the Trebia River to form up on the river bank are but one example of how Hannibal forced or manipulated the Romans into fighting on his terms, and on the ground of his own choosing.

The later debacles at Lake Trasimene and Cannae , forced the proud Romans to avoid battle, shadowing the Carthaginians from the high ground of the Apennines, unwilling to risk a significant engagement on the plains where the enemy cavalry held sway.

Growing Roman tactical sophistication and ability to adapt overcome earlier disasters. But while the case of Hannibal underscored that the Romans were far from invincible, it also demonstrated their long-term strengths.

Rome had a vast manpower surplus far outnumbering Hannibal that gave them more options and flexibility.

They isolated and eventually bottled up the Carthaginians and hastened their withdrawal from Italy with the constant manoeuvre.

More importantly, they used their manpower resources to launch an offensive into Spain and Africa. They were willing to absorb the humiliation in Italy and remain on the strategic defensive, but with typical relentless persistence they struck elsewhere, to finally crush their foes.

They also learned from those enemies. The operations of Scipio were an improvement on some of those who had previously faced Hannibal, showing a higher level of advance thinking, preparation and organization.

Compare with Sempronius at the Battle of the Trebia River for example. Scipio's contribution was in part to implement more flexible manoeuvre of tactical units, instead of the straight-ahead, three-line grind favoured by some contemporaries.

He also made better use of cavalry, traditionally an arm in which the Romans were lacking. His operations also included pincer movements, a consolidated battle line, and "reverse Cannae" formations and cavalry movements.

His victories in Spain and the African campaign demonstrated a new sophistication in Roman warfare and reaffirmed the Roman capacity to adapt, persist and overcome.

Views of the Gallic enemies of Rome have varied widely. Some older histories consider them to be backward savages, ruthlessly destroying the civilization and "grandeur that was Rome.

Often their bravery is celebrated as worthy adversaries of Rome. See the Dying Gaul for an example.

The Gallic opposition was also composed of a large number of different peoples and tribes, geographically ranging from the mountains of Switzerland to the lowlands of France and thus are not easy to categorize.

The term "Gaul" has also been used interchangeably to describe Celtic peoples farther afield in Britain adding even more to the diversity of peoples lumped together under this name.

From a military standpoint, however, they seem to have shared certain general characteristics: tribal polities with a relatively small and lesser elaborated state structure, light weaponry, fairly unsophisticated tactics and organization, a high degree of mobility, and inability to sustain combat power in their field forces over a lengthy period.

Though popular accounts celebrate the legions and an assortment of charismatic commanders quickly vanquishing massive hosts of "wild barbarians", [40] Rome suffered a number of early defeats against such tribal armies.

As early as the Republican period circa — BC , they had sacked Rome under Brennus , and had won several other victories such as the Battle of Noreia and the Battle of Arausio.

Henceforth, July 18 was considered an unlucky date on the Roman Calendar. Some writers suggest that as a result of such debacles, the expanding Roman power began to adjust to this vigorous, fast-moving new enemy.

The circular hoplite shield was also enlarged and eventually replaced with the rectangular scutum for better protection. The heavy phalanx spear was replaced by the pila, suitable for throwing.

Only the veterans of the triarii retained the long spear- vestige of the former phalanx. Such early reforms also aided the Romans in their conquest of the rest of Italy over such foes as the Samnites, Latins and Greeks.

In the early imperial period, however, Germanic warbands inflicted one of Rome's greatest military defeats, the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest which saw the destruction of three imperial legions and was to place a limit on Roman expansion in the West.

And it was these Germanic tribes in part most having some familiarity with Rome and its culture, and becoming more Romanized themselves that were to eventually bring about the Roman military's final demise in the West.

Ironically, in the final days, the bulk of the fighting was between forces composed mostly of barbarians on either side. Whatever their particular culture, the Gallic and Germanic tribes generally proved themselves to be tough opponents, racking up several victories over their enemies.

Some historians show that they sometimes used massed fighting in tightly packed phalanx-type formations with overlapping shields, and employed shield coverage during sieges.

In open battle, they sometimes used a triangular "wedge" style formation in attack. Their greatest hope of success lay in 4 factors: a numerical superiority, b surprising the Romans via an ambush for example or in c advancing quickly to the fight, or d engaging the Romans over heavily covered or difficult terrain where units of the fighting horde could shelter within striking distance until the hour of decision, or if possible, withdraw and regroup between successive charges.

Most significant Gallic and Germanic victories show two or more of these characteristics. The Battle of the Teutoburg Forest contains all four: numerical superiority, surprise, quick charges to close rapidly, and favorable terrain and environmental conditions thick forest and pounding rainstorms that hindered Roman movement and gave the warriors enough cover to conceal their movements and mount successive attacks against the Roman line.

Another factor in the Romans' defeat was a treacherous defection by Arminius and his contingent. Weaknesses in organization and equipment. Against the fighting men from the legion however, the Gauls, Iberians and Germanic forces faced a daunting task.

The barbarians' rudimentary organization and tactics fared poorly against the well-oiled machinery that was the Legion.

The fierceness of the Gallic and Germanic charges is often commented upon by some writers, and in certain circumstances, they could overwhelm Roman lines.

Nevertheless, the in-depth Roman formation allowed adjustments to be made, and the continual application of forwarding pressure made long-term combat a hazardous proposition for the Gauls.

Flank attacks were always possible, but the legion was flexible enough to pivot to meet this, either through sub-unit manoeuvre or through the deployment of lines farther back.

The cavalry screen on the flanks also added another layer of security, as did nightly regrouping in fortified camps.

The Gauls and Germans also fought with little or no armour and with weaker shields, putting them at a disadvantage against the legion.

Other items of Roman equipment from studded sandals, to body armour, to metal helmets added to Roman advantages.

Generally speaking, the Gauls and Germans needed to get into good initial position against the Romans and to overwhelm them in the early phases of the battle.

An extended set-piece slogging match between the lightly armed tribesmen and the well-organized heavy legionaries usually spelt doom for the tribal fighters.

Weaknesses in logistics. Roman logistics also provided a trump card against Germanic foes as it had against so many previous foes.

Tacitus in his Annals reports that the Roman commander Germanicus recognized that continued operations in Gaul would require long trains of men and material to come overland, where they would be subject to attack as they traversed the forests and swamps.

He, therefore, opened sea and river routes, moving large quantities of supplies and reinforcements relatively close to the zone of battle, bypassing the dangerous land routes.

In addition, the Roman fortified camps provided secure staging areas for offensive, defensive and logistical operations, once their troops were deployed.

Assault roads and causeways were constructed on the marshy ground to facilitate manoeuvre, sometimes under direct Gallic attack. These Roman techniques repeatedly defeated their Germanic adversaries.

The Gallic also demonstrated a high level of tactical prowess in some areas. Gallic chariot warfare, for example, showed a high degree of integration and coordination with infantry, and Gallic horse and chariot assaults sometimes threatened Roman forces in the field with annihilation.

At the Battle of Sentinum for example, c. The discipline of the Roman infantry restored the line, however, and a counterattack eventually defeated the Gallic forces and their allies.

The accounts of Polybius leading up to the Battle of Telamon , c. The Gauls met comprehensive defeat by the Roman legions under Papus and Regulus.

Chariot forces also attacked the legions as they were disembarking from ships during Caesar's invasion of Britain, but the Roman commander drove off the fast-moving assailants using covering fire slings, arrows and engines of war from his ships and reinforcing his shore party of infantry to charge and drive off the attack.

During the clash, the chariots would drop off their warriors to attack the enemy and retire a short distance away, massed in reserve.

From this position, they could retrieve the assault troops if the engagement was going badly, or apparently, pick them up and deploy elsewhere.

Caesar's troops were discomfited by one such attack, and he met it by withdrawing into his fortified redoubt. A later Gallic attack against the Roman camp was routed.

Superb as the Gallic fighters were, chariots were already declining as an effective weapon of war in the ancient world with the rise of mounted cavalry.

However, they were no longer used in an offensive role but primarily for the pre-battle show - riding back and forth and hurling insults.

The main encounter was decided by infantry and mounted cavalry. Superior Gallic mobility and numbers often troubled Roman arms, whether deployed in decades-long mobile or guerrilla warfare or in decisive field engagement.

The near-defeat of Caesar in his Gallic campaign confirms this latter pattern but also shows the strengths of Roman tactical organization and discipline.

At the Battle of the Sabis river, see more detailed article contingents of the Nervii , Atrebates, Veromandui and Aduatuci tribes massed secretly in the surrounding forests as the main Roman force was busy making camp on the opposite side of the river.

Some distance away behind them slogged two slow-moving legions with the baggage train. Engaged in foraging and camp construction the Roman forces were somewhat scattered.

As camp building commenced, the barbarian forces launched a ferocious attack, streaming across the shallow water and quickly assaulting the distracted Romans.

This incident is discussed in Caesar's Gallic War Commentaries. So far the situation looked promising for the warrior host. Early progress was spectacular as the initial Roman dispositions were driven back.

A rout looked possible. Caesar himself rallied sections of his endangered army, impressing resolve upon the troops.

With their customary discipline and cohesion, the Romans then began to drive back the barbarian assault. A charge by the Nervi tribe through a gap between the legions however almost turned the tide again, as the onrushing warriors seized the Roman camp and tried to outflank the other army units engaged with the rest of the tribal host.

The initial phase of the clash had passed however and a slogging match ensued. The arrival of the two rear legions that had been guarding the baggage reinforced the Roman lines.

Led by the 10th Legion, a counterattack was mounted with these reinforcements that broke the back of the barbarian effort and sent the tribesmen reeling in retreat.

It was a close-run thing, illustrating both the fighting prowess of the tribal forces and the steady, disciplined cohesion of the Romans.

Ultimately, the latter was to prove decisive in Rome's long fought conquest of Gaul. As noted above, the fierce charge of the Gauls and their individual prowess is frequently acknowledged by several ancient Roman writers.

Under their war leader Vercingetorix , the Gallic pursued what some modern historians have termed a "persisting" or "logistics strategy" - a mobile approach relying not on direct open field clashes, but avoidance of major battle, "scorched earth" denial of resources, and the isolation and piecemeal destruction of Roman detachments and smaller unit groupings.

According to Caesar himself, during the siege of the town of Bourges, the lurking warbands of Gauls were:. Caesar countered with a strategy of enticing the Gallic forces out into open battle, or of blockading them into submission.

At the town of Gergovia, resource denial was combined with a concentration of superior force and multiple threats from more than one direction.

This caused the opposing Roman forces to divide and ultimately fail. Gergovia was situated on the high ground of a tall hill, and Vercingetorix carefully drew up the bulk of his force on the slope, positioning allied tribes in designated places.

He drilled his men and skirmished daily with the Romans, who had overrun a hilltop position and had created a small camp some distance from Caesar's larger main camp.

A rallying of about 10, disenchanted Aeudan tribesmen engineered by Vercingetorix's agents created a threat in Caesar's rear, including a threat to a supply convoy promised by the allied Aeudans, and he diverted four legions to meet this danger.

Caesar dealt with the real threat, turned around and by ruthlessly forced marching once again consolidated his forces at the town. A feint using bogus cavalry by the Romans drew off part of the Gallic assault, and the Romans advanced to capture three more enemy outposts on the slope, and proceeded towards the walls of the stronghold.

The diverted Gallic forces returned however and in frantic fighting outside the town walls, the Romans lost men, including 46 centurions.

Caesar commenced a retreat from the town with the victorious Gallic warriors in pursuit. The Roman commander, however, mobilized his 10th Legion as a blocking force to cover his withdrawal and after some fighting, the tribesmen themselves withdrew back to Gergovia, taking several captured legion standards.

The vicious fighting around Gergovia was the first time Caesar had suffered a military reverse, demonstrating the Gallic martial valor noted by the ancient chroniclers.

The hard battle is referenced by the Roman historian Plutarch, who writes of the Averni people showing visitors a sword in one of their temples, a weapon that reputedly belonged to Caesar himself.

According to Plutarch, the Roman general was shown the sword in the temple at Gergovia some years after the battle, but he refused to reclaim it, saying that it was consecrated, and to leave it where it was.

The Gallic were unable to sustain their strategy, however, and Vercingetorix was to become trapped in Alesia, facing not divided sections or detachments of the Roman Army but Caesar's full force of approximately 70, men 50, legionnaires plus numerous additional auxiliary cavalry and infantry.

This massive concentration of Romans was able to besiege the fortress in detail and repulse Gallic relief forces, and it fell in little more than a month.

As historian A. Goldsworthy notes: "His [Vercingetorix's] strategy was considerably more sophisticated than that employed by Caesar's earlier opponents..

The Gauls gave battle at a place where they were inadequately provisioned for an extended siege, and where Caesar could bring his entire field force to bear on a single point without them being dissipated, and where his lines of supply were not effectively interdicted.

Together with a strong defensive anvil, the town supported by an offensive hammer the open field forces , and coupled with previous resource denial pressure over time, the Romans were forced to retreat, and the Gallic secured a victory.

As one historian notes about the persisting strategy:. In their battles against a wide variety of opponents, Rome's ruthless persistence, greater resources and stronger organization wore down their opponents over time.

Opponents could be relentlessly weakened and exhausted over the long run. As long as the Roman Senate and its successors were willing to replace and expend more men and material decade after decade, victory could be bought through a strategy of exhaustion.

The systematic wastage and destruction of enemy economic and human resources were called vastatio by the Romans.

Crops and animals were destroyed or carried off, and local populaces were massacred or enslaved. Sometimes these tactics were also used to conduct punitive raids on barbarian tribes which had performed raids across the border.

In the campaigns of Germanicus, Roman troops in the combat area carried out a "scorched earth" approach against their Germanic foes, devastating the land they depended on for supplies.

The Roman commander Severus avoided meeting the hard-fighting Jewish rebels in the open field. Instead, he relied on attacking their fortified strongpoints and devastating the zone of conflict in a methodical campaign.

Some historians note however that Rome often balanced brutal attrition with shrewd diplomacy, as demonstrated by Caesar's harsh treatment of Gallic tribes that opposed him, but his sometimes conciliatory handling of those that submitted.

Rome also used a variety of incentives to encourage cooperation by the elites of conquered peoples, co-opting opposition and incorporating them into the structure of the empire.

This carrot and stick approach forms an integral part of "the Roman way" of war. The Romans understood this concept very well and realized that training soldiers could include paying for his rations [food] , his salary, his armour, his armaments [weapons] , and a soldier's honorarium [which was paid to those who received honourable discharges].

With all this in perspective, they realized each individual soldier was a far too valuable resource to waste.

They knew the costs they were incurring for each soldier had to be quite similar on their enemy's side. So they developed a tactic that could cause a significant setback or even defeat for their enemy while only creating a limited risk for their own soldiers.

The basic principle behind these tactics was to disrupt their enemies' resources while increasing Roman resources.

Without a regular supply of food, water, and other commodities, armies would begin to starve or dehydrate, resulting in low morale or killing of fellow soldiers.

Cavalry opponents were one of the toughest challenges faced by the Roman infantry. Combining both missile and shock capability with extensive mobility, cavalry exploited the inherent weakness of the legion—its relatively slow movement and deployment.

Defeat by strong cavalry forces is a recurring event in Roman military history. Hannibal's great victory at Cannae considered one of the greatest Roman defeats ever was primarily an infantry struggle, but the key role was played by his cavalry, as in his other victories.

An even more dramatic demonstration of Roman vulnerability is shown in the numerous wars against Parthian heavy cavalry.

Both types of troops used powerful composite bows that shot arrows of sufficient strength to penetrate Roman armour.

The cataphracts extended combat power by serving as shock troops, engaging opposing forces with their heavy lances in thundering charges after they had been "softened up" by swarms of arrows.

The Parthians also conducted a "scorched earth" policy against the Romans, refusing major set-piece encounters, while luring them deeper on to the unfavorable ground, where they would lack water supplies and a secure line of retreat.

The debacle of the Battle of Carrhae saw a devastating defeat of Roman arms by the Parthian cavalry. Roman casualties were approcimately 20, killed and 10, captured making the battle one of the costliest defeats in Roman history.

Parthian casualties were minimal. Clues exist in the earlier campaigns of Alexander the Great against mounted Asiatic warriors—engaging the horsemen with strong detachments of light infantry and missile troops and driving them off with charges by Alexander's heavy cavalry units.

The Roman variant, with its large manpower resources, continued the same "combined arms" approach, with a larger role for cavalry as the empire went on.

The Eastern half of the Roman Empire , particularly, was ultimately to rely mostly on cavalry forces.

Adjustments of Ventidius. The operations of the Roman commander Publius Ventidius Bassus illustrate three general tactics used by the infantry to fight their mounted foes.

These drew on Caesar's veteran legions and made Ventidius one of the Roman generals to celebrate a triumph against the Parthians.

In three separate battles, he not only managed to defeat the Parthian armies and drive them out of the Roman territory but also managed to kill Parthia's three top military commanders during the battles.

Combined arms and quick advance in later eras. Sad face. This old skool-looking slot is old fashioned when it comes to the extras too, and sadly there are no free spins or multipliers on offer here.

Instead you have the Re-Win feature. If you feel like Lady Luck is on your side, then have a go at the gamble option.

Get it right and you double your win. Double Triple Chance slot is not bad for a 3 reel game, but it is very basic indeed. Play Now Double Triple Chance.

Game Categories. Play Now. Game Play Double Triple Chance is slot a 3 reel game with 3 rows and just 5 pay-lines.

4 thoughts on “Double Triple Chance Taktik”

Leave a Comment